Seven years ago, a mere eight words to energize a Labour conference demonstrating the party was falling out of love with Jeremy Corbyn. While not precisely soaring oratory, the phrase met with rapturous applause as delegates rose in an impromptu ovation.
When the noise subsided, Keir Starmer, remained at the lectern, blinking in surprise. He was unaccustomed to his speeches producing such a reaction. All he had said was: "Nobody is ruling out remain as an option". But context is everything.
In that darkly divisive time of 2018, departing from his agreed text like this was inevitably viewed as issuing a challenge to Jeremy Corbyn, who sought to prioritize leave supporters in key constituencies above the Europhile sentiments of his party. In just one speech, this grey-suited opposition Brexit spokesman underwent a transformation – if only for a while – into a political gambler who championed most Labour MPs, members and voters against a leader he later succeeded.
The Evolution in Position and Closed Issues
In the years since, the landscape has shifted, especially for Starmer himself. An early move upon assuming leadership from Corbyn in 2020 was to declare the Brexit issue was resolved by the previous year’s general election. And, at the last one, he consistently stressed unbreakable pledge commitments that ruled out rejoining the European Union or its core structures.
Like his predecessor, his strategy has focused on winning pro-Leave voters in target constituencies, despite polling evidence indicates many of them have died or changed their minds.
Pressure Building on the EU
However, it’s now the prime minister’s turn to face the pressures of being a Labour leader. And, if Europe is no longer the boiling pot in UK politics, the cap that has been kept tightly sealed for five years is starting to loosen again.
The Prime Minister and Chancellor have intensified their language about the devastation caused by Brexit has caused to the UK’s economy. It’s a useful stick with which to beat the Reform UK leader, who now rarely mentions his flagship policy was once his singular purpose and remains his sole political accomplishment.
Nevertheless, the extent of the economic harm, which by some estimates has resulted in an economy that is significantly diminished compared to EU membership, towers over the micro-mitigation thus far implemented by the government. Starmer’s so-called re-set deal negotiated with the EU in 2024 provides gains measured in fractions of a percent.
Internal Pressure & Ambitious Proposals
The chancellor is one of those trying to overcome entrenched Home Office resistance to a broader scheme of a growth-enabling youth mobility scheme allowing young people can move between the UK and the EU to study or work.
The deputy prime minister muses openly about the clear advantages of joining an EU customs pact, as several Labour backbenchers, such as the head of the powerful finance committee, recently voted for an opposition proposal on customs union membership.
While the Europe minister, the minister in charge of UK-EU relations, who is now attending all cabinet sessions, maintains the red lines remain unchanged, there are ways to work around them. One idea would be to announce the start of negotiations now on a much bolder deal, to be featured in the following election platform, to be enacted only after Labour won a fresh mandate.
The Prime Minister's Deep-Seated Scepticism
Yet, Starmer has lately been damping it all down on the idea by warning rejoining a European customs area could undermine the trade pacts with America, which he regards as signature achievements of his premiership.
Reportedly that the PM’s scepticism run even deeper, and is rooted in several key concerns.
- First, he thinks a customs pact is now significantly more difficult as ministers are actively diverging from EU regulations across a range of sectors, like environmental standards.
- Secondly, the prohibitive cost demanded from Britain for entry into a European defense initiative and the subsequent collapse of negotiations has led British officials that former EU partners are less interested in cutting special deals with Britain than in demonstrating that leaving the EU was a mistake.
- Thirdly, America's latest security doctrine, praised by Moscow, is viewed by some influential figures in Downing Street as grounds for the UK to maintain distance from the EU.
An Alarming Strategy and Strategic Considerations
This strange and concerning American strategy paper claims Europe is threatened by “civilizational erasure” due to Muslim migration. It contains a single mention to Britain, placed beside a suggestion that Donald Trump’s administration may interfere in our politics to foster the rise of nationalist movements.
But, far from deciding that this renders the US an undependable ally, ministers is worried that aligning closer with Europe could upset the global balance by endangering fragile US military support for Kyiv, NATO, and other alliances.
Leadership Speculation and The Echo of 2018
This situation returns us to the conference of 2018. Starmer has always said that address was not a pitch to become leader but merely an effort to preserve the possibility of remain in a future vote. Indeed, in those days, he still supported a tailored trade agreement similar to the one he currently seems to reject.
Observers within Downing Street note that Wes Streeting, widely considered would stand in any leadership election, is part of a clutch of senior ministers signaling they want to go further regarding the EU.
Aides to the Deputy Prime Minister, another probable runner in a contest to replace Starmer, insist she refuses to comment on her position regarding a customs pact as it would merely “escalate unhelpful speculation”.
The Clear Risk and A Prudent Reminder
The risk is clear. Should the PM reject more meaningful steps towards a close relationship, he cedes ground to occupy the space where the overwhelming majority of the party's supporters reside.
It would be prudent for Starmer to recall the impact just a few words had on his career seven years ago. Potential pathways for a big offer on Europe which the PM should not “rule out”; he should prise them open personally, rather than letting rivals adopt them as their own.
